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Abstract
Graph Neural Networks(GNNs) are useful deep learning models to deal with the non-Euclid data.
However, recent works show that GNNs are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Small perturbations
can lead to poor performance in many GNNs, such as Graph attention networks(GATs). Therefore,
enhancing the robustness of GNNs is a critical problem. Robust GAT(RoGAT) is proposed to
improve the robustness of GNNs in this paper, . Note that the original GAT uses the attention
mechanism for different edges but is still sensitive to the perturbation, RoGAT adjusts the edges’
weight to adjust the attention scores progressively. Firstly, RoGAT tunes the edges weight based
on the assumption that the adjacent nodes should have similar nodes. Secondly, RoGAT further
tunes the features to eliminate feature’s noises since even for the clean graph, there exists some
unreasonable data. Then, we trained the adjusted GAT model to defense the adversarial attacks.
Different experiments against targeted and untargeted attacks demonstrate that RoGAT outperforms
significantly than most the state-of-the-art defense methods. The implementation of RoGAT based
on the DeepRobust repository for adversarial attacks.
1 Introduction
Non-Euclid data occurs widely in our daily life. Graph Neural Networks(GNNs) are proposed to deal with
these data represented by graphs. GNNs corresponding to node classification problems are usually tightly
connected with two permutation invariant primitives[1][2]: a local aggregation function which updates
each nodes representation by combining the features in its neighbors and a readout function that combines
all learned node embeddings to obtain a graph representation. The two procedures can be concluded in
the framework of GraphSAGE[3]. For example, the Graph Convolution Network(GCN)[4][5][6] are kinds
of GrahSAGE. Furthermore, the attention mechanisms, e.g self-attention[7] and soft-attention[8], have
significant influence on deep learning, Therefore, the graph attention network(GAT)[9] proposed with
the attention mechanism in aggregation function achieved superior results in node classification and link
prediction problem. The attention mechanism made the model focus on the most relevant parts. GAT
model also computes the hidden representation by the features of connected nodes, and the attention
weight coefficients, which are calculated by the self-attention applied to the features. Although GAT
is a superior GNN in dealing with graph data, it is also vulnerable to adversarial attacks like ordinary
GNNs. One reason is that like GNN, the aggregation function for GAT is tightly connected with graph
structure and features[10][11], which are directly disturbed by attacks. Another reason is that GAT only
calculates the attention coefficients by the neighbors’ features. The attention score cannot distinguish
whether the neighbor’s is real or generated by attacks. The performance of GAT might be degraded
significantly by the adversarial attacks. Therefore, as one type of GNN, how to improve the performance
of GAT under the adversarial attacks achieves much attention.
Recently, there are some research about the adversarial attacks and defense on GNNs. The graph
adversarial attacks can be divided into targeted attacks and untargeted attacks. The targeted attacks
like nettack[12] and RL-S2V[10] tend to let the trained model misclassify small set of test samples, while
untargeted attacks like metatack aim to let the trained model have bad overall performance on all test
data. Nettack introduced the unnoticeable perturbations on both structures and features. RL-S2V used
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reinforcement learning to generate attacks on GNNs. The metattack parametrized the graph structure
and used the gradient information to attack GNNs.
As to the method to defense the adversarial attacks, one perspective is establishing a Max-Min
problem. Xu[13] used Projected Gradient Descent(PGD) to obtain the smallest loss under the attack.
Another perspective to defense the attacks is to eliminate the influence of perturbations such as adding
or removing the adversarial edges or clearing up the change of node features. The prior information of
graph in specific applications can give the criteria of revision.
For example, Wu[11] applied the Jaccard similarity to eliminate the edges between nodes with low
similarity. RGCN in [14] added the penalization of adversarial edge and modeled the hidden layers by
Gaussian distributions to reduce the effect of attacks. ProGNN[15] assumed that the graph should be
low-rank and sparse and then gave a progressive model for adversarial training, which is efficient but
time-consuming. These models used the poisoned graph for training and estimated the clean graph
by prior information[16][14]. Besides, GNNguard[17] estimated an importance weight for every edge to
reduce the influence of fake edges.
Although these defensive methods improve the robustness of GNN against different attacks, the
robustness of GAT has not been discussed thoroughly. As GAT uses the attention mechanisms to mix
various features, the intuition is that GAT can adjust the attention scores for fake and edges automatically
to resist the attacks during the training procedure. However, the performance of GAT against adversarial
attacks degrades obviously.
In this paper, we focus on how to design an effective GAT defending the poisoning attack that a
graph is perturbed before training. We aim to design an improved GAT to adjust the attention scores
for real edges and adversarial edges. We are faced with two problems: (1) how to distinguish between
the fake and real edges in the training procedure. (2) what skills should we take to adjust the attention
scores for different edges? Therefore, this paper proposed a Robust GAT(RoGAT) to defend adversarial
attacks by increasing extra edge attention scores to distinguish real from adversarial edges. Using feature
smoothness assumption, the ratio of attention scores between real edges and adversarial edges increases
in the training procedure, which means that the influence of adversarial attacks is eliminated. The
experiments on various real-world graphs show that RoGAT can adjust the ratio of attention scores
between fake and real edges iteratively and outperform other defense methods in the node classification
task under different types of attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the original GAT and discusses the
relative merits of GAT. And RoGAT is proposed to improve the performance of defending attacks in
section 3 Section 4 gives some experiments to verify the conclusion. Section 5 gives a further discussion
of our methods. The last part gives the acknowledgment.
2 The proposed framework
2.1 Notations
Let G = (V,E) be a graph, where V = {v1, v2, · · · , vN} is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges.
Each graph can be represented by the adjacency matrix A ∈ RN×N , aij where the (i, j)th elements of A
represents the link weight of node vi and vj . In addition, X = [x1, x2, · · · , xN ]> ∈ RN×d is used to denote
the node feature matrix where xi is the feature vector of the node vi. Hence a simple representation of
a graph is G = (V,A,X).
Here we consider the semi-supervised node classification problem. Only parts of node Vp = {v1, v2, · · · , vm}
are part of labels with annotations. Yp = {y1, y2, · · · , ym} where yi is the label of vi. The goal of node
classification is that we use the given graph G = (V,A,X) with partial label Yp to predict the labels of
unlabeled nodes.
2.2 GAT
As one type of Graph Neural Network(GNN), graph attention network(GAT) is a powerful method
to solve machine learning problems on the graph. The basic architecture of GNNs consists of multi-
layers that form the new information of one node by combining the feature vector of each node in its
neighbors. GNNs can be represented by aggregation faggregation and combination fcombination functions.
In formulation, for a GNN with L layer, the update rule of node v is given by:
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a(k)v = f
(k)
aggregation
({
x(k−1)u : u ∈ N (v)
})
(1)
x(k)v = f
(k)
combination
(
x(k−1)v , a
(k)
v
)
, (2)
where k = 1, · · · , L, x(0)v is the input feature of xv and N (u) represents the neighbors of node u As for
GAT, it uses the summation for aggregation and combination. And the weight α is computed by the
features of neighbors. The formulation of GAT can be denoted by
x(k)v = σ
 ∑
u∈N (v)
α(k−1)uv Wx
(k−1)
u
 , (3)
where
α(k−1)uv =
exp
(
Leaky ReLU
(−→a T [Wx(k−1)v ‖Wx(k−1)u ]))∑
k∈N (v) exp
(
LeakyReLU
(−→a T [Wx(k−1)v ‖Wx(k−1)k ])) (4)
. W is the learning parameters. σ is the activation function.
And the multi-head attention is used to improve the performance of GAT.
x(k)v = ‖Mm=1σ
 ∑
u∈N (v)
(α(k−1)uv W)
mx(k−1)u
 , (5)
where ‖ represents concatenation. The update feature x(k)v relies on the neighbors’ features x(k−1)u and
the weight αij are computed by the features.
Denote all the learning parameters of GAT by θ. θ includes all the W in each layer. Then for node
classification problem, GAT learns a function fθ : V → Y by applying Boolean classification function to
x
(L)
v to predict unlabeled nodes. And the objective function are the sum of loss in labeled nodes,
min
θ
LGNN (θ,A,X,Yp) =
∑
vi∈Vp
`(fθ(X,A)i, yi), (6)
where θ is the parameters of GNN and (fθ(X,A)i is the prediction result of node vi. `(·, ·) is a loss
function between the prediction and known label of nodes.
2.3 Analysis of GAT
Since GATs learns the new feature of the node by aggregating the neighbors’ features to update the
representation of node, it faces a problem that if all the features of neighbors make positive effects to
obtain the update node feature. And what criteria can be used to revise the neighbors’ feature. In
intuition, GAT can automatically adjust attention scores to reduce the adversarial edges’ negative effect.
But it might performs quite terribly with attacks.
Here we give an example for further discussion. As is shown in Figure 1, the first picture is an original
graph with 10 nodes, whose labeled are denoted by green and blue colors. Here we assume that node
1’s is unknown, and we want to use the nodes 2-10 to infer its color. If the graph is poisoned by the
red edge between nodes 1 and 7, now we use the GAT to predict node 1’s label. The updated label of
node 1 will be affected by the neighbors. As is shown in the third figure, the neighbors of node 1 can
be divided into two parts: the neighbors with positive and negative effects. Part of edges with negative
effects are colored by yellow. Two edges in original graph are also colored by yellow. Therefore, it may
not have the best performance for the supervised problem on the original graph. As shown in [18], for
the citation networks like cora, citeseer and pubmed, only a small number of frequency components have
useful information to learning. If GAT can distinguish the positive and negative effects of neighbors, the
robustness of GAT can be enhanced. To adjust the effects of neighbors, two strategies can be selected.
First, we can reduce the attention scores of negative nodes. Second, we can adjust the feature of negative
nodes. Based on these thoughts, we proposed Robust GAT.
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Figure 1. Two graphs with part unreasonable structure and feature
3 The proposed framework
3.1 RoGAT
GAT has an excellent performance on the semi-supervised task with the dynamic weight. However, the
performance against adversarial attacks is relatively terrible. We may think that the attention mechanism
of GAT can impair the influence of disturbing node features or link since if it could choose relatively
small attention scores for those fake or disturbed edges. But it failed on the poisoned graph. It is due to
that the attention scores in GAT are computed based on the node features[19]. The graph structure only
decides the choice of neighbors. There is no attention difference caused by the graph structure, which
is not reasonable1. Inspired by the work of [19], which mixed features and structure to obtain attention
scores, we choose a new attention score combined the structure and feature attention, which is divided
into three parts.
3.1.1 Modify the GAT attention
As shown in GAT, the attention scores are computed by the neighbors’ features, which make it hard to
recognize fake or adversarial edges. Therefore, we decide to attach another attention score determined by
structure, which can be used to distinguish the fake and adversarial edges. Then the RoGAT is revised
by
x(k)v = ‖Mm=1σ
 ∑
u∈N (v)
(α¯(k−1)uv W)
mx(k−1)u
 , (7)
where α¯ij is a new attention combined the feature attention (4) and graph structure attention obtained
by the feature smoothness assumption defined by
α¯ij = aijαij .
Here aij is the link weight representing the local structure.
3.1.2 Modify the graph structure
In most situation, the connected nodes in a graph tends to share similar features. For example, in citation
network, the entities with the similar bag-of-words feature tends to connect[6]. And two individuals in
1We do not use the sparse and low-rank assumption in [15], which is not suitable for all data and is time-consuming in
computation.
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social graph may share the similar features since they tend to have the related hobbies or characters[20].
There, we use the LA to adjust the graph structure:
arg minLS
A¯∈A¯
, = ‖A− A¯‖2 + α
2
N∑
i,j=1
Aij (xi − xj)2
= ‖A− A¯‖2 + α tr (X>L¯X) (8)
where α is a hyper-parameter to balance the constraint of feature smoothness and L¯ represents the
laplacian matrix defined by L¯ = D¯ − A¯, where D¯ii = ΣjA¯ij is the diagonal element of degree matrix
D¯.A represents the domain of adjacency matrix.
3.1.3 Modify the graph feature
After we revised the graph structure, we further make an adjustment to revise the graph feature, which
can alleviate the negative effects for the update node features. Since our task is to reduce the LGNN
defined in [15], we use LGNN as a part of the loss to guide the training of feature.We construct the
objective function as:
arg minLf
X¯∈X¯
= ‖X − X¯‖2 + γ 1
2
N∑
i,j=1
A¯ij (x¯i − x¯j)2 + λLGNN (θ, A¯, X¯,Yp)
= ‖X − X¯‖2 + γ tr (X¯>L¯X¯)+ λLGNN (θ, A¯, X¯,Yp),
(9)
where X¯ represents the domain of node feature.
3.2 The optimization algorithm
Given the graph G = (V,A,X) with partial nodes Vp with label Yp. As is mentioned in section 3.1, our
proposed RoGNN model can be described as the following optimization problem:
min
θ
LGNN (θ, A¯, X¯,YL) =
∑
vi∈VL
`(fθ(X¯, A¯)i, yi),
s.t.A¯ ∈ arg min
A¯∈A¯
Ls and X¯ ∈ arg minLf
X¯∈X¯
.
(10)
Actually this model is a bilevel programming which is a problem where some variables in the objective
function are constrained to be an optimal solution of another optimization problem[21]. Here the param-
eters A¯ and X¯ are the solution of inner optimization problems. We use the iterative method to compute
this optimization problem.
We establish the iteration algorithm 1 as followed:
4 Experiments
In the experiment part, we firstly empirically evaluate RoGAT on semi-supervised problem with the state
of art defense methods under different kinds of adversarial attacks. Then we analysis the parameters
and explain why our methods work.
4.1 Experimental settings
4.1.1 Experimental dataset
We choose three benchmark datasets used in [12][22]. To evaluate our proposed method, we choose the
largest component of these datasets following [23][15].
NLCC ELCC Classes Features
Cora 2, 485 5, 069 7 1, 433
Citeseer 2, 110 3, 668 6 3, 703
Polblogs 1, 222 16, 714 2 /
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Algorithm 1 RoGAT
Input: Graph G = (V,A,X) and part nodes Vp with labels Yp.
Parameters:
α, γ, λ: the adjustment parameter for different terms
T1,T2:outer and inner maximum iteration step
η1, η2, η:learning rate for different iteration.
Output: the GAT model with learned parameters θ.
1: Initialize the GAT model with given structure A and set A¯←− A, X¯ ←− X.
2: Randomly initialize the parameter θ of GAT.
3: for i = 1 to T1 do:
4: A¯←− A¯− η1∇A¯(‖A− A¯‖2 + α tr
(
X¯>L¯X¯
)
)
5: X¯ ←− X¯ − η2∇X¯(‖X − X¯‖2 + γ tr
(
X¯>L¯X¯
)
+ λLGNN (θ, A¯, X¯,Yp))
6: for i = 1 to T2 do:
7: θ ← θ − η ∂LGNN(θ,A¯,X¯,yp)∂θ
8: Return θ and GAT.
4.1.2 Baselines
Here we compare RoGAT with state of the art GNN and implement the defensive models by the Deep-
Robust library. [24]
• GCN[6]: The classical and widely used GCN give by Kipf.
• GAT[9]: GAT uses the attention mechanisms to learn the representation of nodes.
• RGCN[14]: RGCN assumes that all the node representations are defined by Gauss distributions
and use attention mechanism to reduce the influence the nodes with high variance.
• GCN-Jaccard[11] : As attacks tend to link the nodes with huge features’ difference, GCN-Jaccard
makes a judgment to eliminate part of edges between nodes with small similarity. The method can
work when the features of the nodes are available.
• GCN-SVD[23]: Since nettack is a high-rank attack, GCN-SVD uses an low-rank approximation
of the perturbed graph for further training. This model can also be extended to a non-targeted
attacks and random-attacks.
• ProGNN[15]: ProGNN assumes that data in reality is low-rank and sparse. It uses the progressive
procedure to adjust the structure and parameters of GCN. This method performs robustly under
three kinds of attacks but is time-consuming.
4.1.3 Parameter settings
Since RoGAT is based on GAT, we choose the default settings about GAT in [9] with a two-layer model.
Here the dropout parameter p = 0.6 is applied to both layers’ input. The learning rate for the training
feature and adjacency matrix for SGD is set by 0.01. For GCN, we use the default settings in [6]. For
RGCN, we use the same settings as the experiments in [15] with {16, 32, 64, 128} hidden units. For GCN-
Jaccard, {0.01, 0.02, 0.03, 0.04, 0.05, 0.1} are set as the threshold of similarity for removing the edges for
different perturbations ratios. For GCN-SVD, {5, 10, 15, 50, 100, 200} are used as the reduced rank.
For all the tested graphs, we randomly choose 10% of nodes as the training datasets and 10% of nodes
as the validation datasets. The remaining 80% of nodes are used for testing for the non-targeted attack.
All the experiments are executed 10 times with different random seeds. The inner and outer iterations
are set by 10. The other hyper-parameters are selected by the accuracy of the validation and manual
test.
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Table 1. Node classification performance (Accuracy±Std) under non-targeted attacks
Dataset Ptb (%) GCN[6] GAT[9] RGCN[14] GCN-Jaccard[11] GCN-SVD[23] Pro-GNN[15] RoGAT
Cora
0 83.50±0.44 83.97±0.65 83.09±0.44 82.05±0.51 80.63±0.45 82.98±0.23 84.59 ±0.55
5 76.55±0.79 80.44±0.74 77.42±0.39 79.13±0.59 78.39±0.54 82.27±0.45 81.22 ±1.09
10 70.39±1.28 75.61±0.59 72.22±0.38 75.16±0.76 71.47±0.83 79.03±0.59 79.53 ±1.60
15 65.10±0.71 69.78±1.28 66.82±0.39 71.03±0.64 66.69±1.18 76.40±1.27 80.47 ±0.71
20 59.56±2.72 59.94±0.92 59.27±0.37 65.71±0.89 58.94±1.13 73.32±1.56 78.40 ±2.18
25 47.53±1.96 54.78±0.74 50.51±0.78 60.82±1.08 52.06±1.19 69.72±1.69 78.99 ±0.96
Citeseer
0 71.96±0.55 73.26±0.83 71.20±0.83 72.10±0.63 70.65±0.32 73.28±0.69 73.49 ±1.96
5 70.88±0.62 72.89±0.83 70.50±0.43 70.51±0.97 68.84±0.72 72.93±0.57 73.64 ±1.33
10 67.55±0.89 70.63±0.48 67.71±0.30 69.54±0.56 68.87±0.62 72.51±0.75 72.73 ±0.69
15 64.52±1.11 69.02±1.09 65.69±0.37 65.95±0.94 63.26±0.96 72.03±1.11 73.02 ±1.16
20 62.03±3.49 61.04±1.52 62.49±1.22 59.30±1.40 58.55±1.09 70.02±2.28 72.43 ±1.48
25 56.94±2.09 61.85±1.12 55.35±0.66 59.89±1.47 57.18±1.87 68.95±2.78 73.19 ±0.49
Polblogs
0 95.69±0.38 95.35±0.20 95.22±0.14 - 95.31±0.18 - 95.67 ±0.36
5 73.07±0.80 83.69±1.45 74.34±0.19 - 89.09±0.22 - 79.18 ±1.12
10 70.72±1.13 76.32±0.85 71.04±0.34 - 81.24±0.49 - 74.95 ±1.08
15 64.96±1.91 68.80±1.14 67.28±0.38 - 68.10±3.73 - 70.14 ±1.45
20 51.27±1.23 51.50±1.63 59.89±0.34 - 57.33±3.15 - 65.85 ±1.38
25 49.23±1.36 51.19±1.49 56.02±0.56 - 48.66±9.93 - 63.37 ±2.03
4.2 Defensive performance
4.2.1 Under the non-targeted adversarial attack
First, we evaluate the performance of RoGAT against the non-targeted adversarial attack, which aims to
degrade the performance on all nodes. Here we use the metattack as the non-targeted attack and adopt
the same parameter settings as [22]. The Meta-self attack for Cora, CIteseer, and Polblogs is considered
as it is the most effective attack. As is shown in Table 1, we compare RoGAT with the other six methods
and vary the perturbations rate from 0% to 25%. All the experiments are conducted for 10 times, and
then the average accuracy and standard deviation are recorded. RoGAT performs the best under the
meta attack for all the tested datasets.
• RoGAT outperforms other methods for Cora and Citeseer almost for all the f perturbations ratios
and has better performance with larger perturbations for the polblogs dataset. Specifically, RoGAT
improves the accuracy of classification over 13% and 2% than others at the rate of 25% for Cora
and Citeseer, respectively. In addition, under 15% to 25% perturbations for polblogs, RoGAT
performs better than other methods varying from 2% to 15%.
• Although ProGNN has good performance when dealing with Cora and Pubmed under the larger
ratio of perturbations, RoGAT performs best. Compared with ProGNN, RoGAT ignored the
regularization of sparsity and low-rank but can adapt well to the non-targeted adversarial attack.
It means that the attention mechanism of RoGAT considering the feature smoothing can adjust
the weight of fake and real edges.
• Compared with ProGNN, RoGAT has a lower computation time without the regularization of
sparsity. ProGNN cost more than 15 minutes for one script in cora with 2080Ti GPU, while the
average time for one RoGAT training is 20s.
4.2.2 Under the targeted adversarial attack
In this part, we evaluate the performance of different methods about node classification problems against
the targeted attacks, which aims to attack selected nodes. Here we choose the nettack as the targeted-
attack method and use the default parameter in the original paper[12]. The number of perturbations of
per node varies from 1 to 5. And similar to [15], all the nodes with a degree larger than 10 are chosen
as the targeted nodes. We display the performance of node classification for different methods. In figure
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Figure 2. Results of different models under nettack
Figure 3. Results of different models under random attack
2, it shows that our method outperforms most methods and has similar performance with Pro-GNN
under the Cora and Citeseer. Our approach has 10% and 20% improvement, respectively, in Cora and
Citeseer compared with the original GCN. Since the dataset polblogs do not have the feature, our method
performs better than other methods except for GCN-SVD.
We also do some experiments to evaluate our methods when dealing with the random attack, which
adds the perturbation on nodes randomly. Different ratios of perturbations varying from 0% to 100%
are adopted to disturb the graph structure. The results in Figure 3 shows that our RoGAT outperforms
other methods in dealing with Cora and Citeseer and has relatively better performance with the dataset
Polblogs. RoGAT has more than 15% and 13% improvement with Cora and Citeseer. It means that
RoGAT can successfully resist the random attack.
Overall, RoGAT has quite good performance compared with most defensive methods when dealing
with different types of adversarial attacks.
4.2.3 Hyperparameter analysis
In this section, we discuss the influence of hyper-parameters for RoGAT. Here we set α = γ and only
consider the impact of α and λ on the Cora dataset with perturbation rates of 25% metattack. We vary
α and λ from 0.1 to 6.4 in a log scale base 2 on the Cora dataset, respectively. Figure 4 shows RoGAT
with different λ and α. The introduction of λ and α contributes to the robusty of GAT. Compared
with λ, appropriate value of α has more influences on the performance of RoGAT. The performance of
RoGAT is not sensitive to α and λ with not too large α. It means that the feature smoothness is tightly
connected with the performance of RoGAT. For different kinds of datasets, α decides the ratio between
two parts loss, which needs to be selected carefully. Therefore for RoGAT, using feature smoothness to
revise the structure’s attention is effective in defending adversarial attacks.
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Cora Citeseer Polblogs
Figure 4. The performance for different λ and γ under 25% ptb metattack
Cora Citeseer Polblogs
Figure 5. The ratio of the weight of fake and real edges during training procedure for cora, citeseer and Polblogs
4.3 Attention weight analysis
Since we assume that the revised weight α¯ gives more attentions to real edges and reduce the influence of
fake edges. Here we compute the ratio of weight between the fake edges and real edges during the training
procedure. Here we set α = γ = 1 and compute the average weight α¯ during the training procedure
under the metattack. For different rate of perturbations and dataset, the weight ratio between fake edges
and real edges decreases from the initial value 1 to smaller value. And almost for all three datasets, the
ratio decreases faster for the smaller perturbations, which leads to better performance. As is shown in
Figure 1, real and fake edges make equivalent contributions to the update of node information. The
RoGAT can adjust the Therefore, it is consistent with the assumptions that less attention will be given
to the fake edges to reduce the influence of fake information during the aggregation procedure.
5 Conclusion
Graph neural networks, including graph convolutional networks and graph attention networks are easily
disturbed by graph adversarial attacks. This paper adjusts the attention mechanism and propose the
robust GAT called RoGAT, which revises the structure and feature of the poisoned graph iteratively.
The results of experiments show that RoGAT can reduce the influence of fake edges and performs better
than most of the state-of-the-art baselines, especially in defending the metattack. In further research,
we want to use more prior information to improve RoGAT.
Acknowlegements
This research work is supported by the National Science Foundation of China(NSFC) under 61977065.
9
References
[1] F. Scarselli, M. Gori, Ah Chung Tsoi, M. Hagenbuchner, and G. Monfardini. The graph neural
network model. IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks, 20(1):61, 2009.
[2] Justin Gilmer, Samuel S. Schoenholz, Patrick F. Riley, Oriol Vinyals, and George E. Dahl. Neural
message passing for quantum chemistry. In Proceedings of the 34th International Conference on
Machine Learning - Volume 70, ICML’17, page 12631272. JMLR.org, 2017.
[3] Will Hamilton, Zhitao Ying, and Jure Leskovec. Inductive representation learning on large graphs.
In I. Guyon, U. V. Luxburg, S. Bengio, H. Wallach, R. Fergus, S. Vishwanathan, and R. Garnett, ed-
itors, Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 30, pages 1024–1034. Curran Associates,
Inc., 2017.
[4] Joan Bruna, Wojciech Zaremba, Arthur Szlam, and Yann Lecun. Spectral networks and locally
connected networks on graphs. arXiv: Learning, 2013.
[5] Michae¨l Defferrard, Xavier Bresson, and Pierre Vandergheynst. Convolutional neural networks on
graphs with fast localized spectral filtering. In Advances in neural information processing systems,
pages 3844–3852, 2016.
[6] Thomas Kipf and Max Welling. Semi-supervised classification with graph convolutional networks.
arXiv: Learning, 2016.
[7] Ashish Vaswani, Noam Shazeer, Niki Parmar, Jakob Uszkoreit, Llion Jones, Aidan N Gomez,  Lukasz
Kaiser, and Illia Polosukhin. Attention is all you need. In Advances in neural information processing
systems, pages 5998–6008, 2017.
[8] Dzmitry Bahdanau, Kyunghyun Cho, and Yoshua Bengio. Neural machine translation by jointly
learning to align and translate. arXiv: Computation and Language, 2014.
[9] Petar Velikovi, Guillem Cucurull, Arantxa Casanova, Adriana Romero, Pietro Li, and Yoshua Ben-
gio. Graph attention networks. In International Conference on Learning Representations, 2018.
[10] Hanjun Dai, Hui Li, Tian Tian, Xin Huang, Lin Wang, Jun Zhu, and Le Song. Adversarial attack
on graph structured data. arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.02371, 2018.
[11] Huijun Wu, Chen Wang, Yuriy Tyshetskiy, Andrew Docherty, Kai Lu, and Liming Zhu. Adversarial
examples on graph data: Deep insights into attack and defense. arXiv: Learning, 2019.
[12] Daniel Zu¨gner, Amir Akbarnejad, and Stephan Gu¨nnemann. Adversarial attacks on neural networks
for graph data. In Proceedings of the 24th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge
Discovery & Data Mining, pages 2847–2856, 2018.
[13] Kaidi Xu, Hongge Chen, Sijia Liu, Pin-Yu Chen, Tsui-Wei Weng, Mingyi Hong, and Xue Lin.
Topology attack and defense for graph neural networks: An optimization perspective. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1906.04214, 2019.
[14] Dingyuan Zhu, Ziwei Zhang, Peng Cui, and Wenwu Zhu. Robust graph convolutional networks
against adversarial attacks. In Proceedings of the 25th ACM SIGKDD International Conference
on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, KDD ’19, page 13991407, New York, NY, USA, 2019.
Association for Computing Machinery.
[15] Wei Jin, Yao Ma, Xiaorui Liu, Xianfeng Tang, Suhang Wang, and Jiliang Tang. Graph structure
learning for robust graph neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:2005.10203, 2020.
[16] Xianfeng Tang, Yandong Li, Yiwei Sun, Huaxiu Yao, Prasenjit Mitra, and Suhang Wang. Trans-
ferring robustness for graph neural network against poisoning attacks. In Proceedings of the 13th
International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining, pages 600–608, 2020.
[17] Xiang Zhang and Marinka Zitnik. Gnnguard: Defending graph neural networks against adversarial
attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:2006.08149, 2020.
10
[18] N T Hoang and Takanori Maehara. Revisiting graph neural networks: All we have is low-pass filters.
arXiv: Machine Learning, 2019.
[19] Kai Zhang, Yaokang Zhu, Jun Wang, and Jie Zhang. Adaptive structural fingerprints for graph
attention networks. In International Conference on Learning Representations, 2020.
[20] Miller Mcpherson, Lynn Smithlovin, and James M Cook. Birds of a feather: Homophily in social
networks. Review of Sociology, 27(1):415–444, 2001.
[21] Benoˆıt Colson, Patrice Marcotte, and Gilles Savard. An overview of bilevel optimization. Annals of
operations research, 153(1):235–256, 2007.
[22] Daniel Zu¨gner and Stephan Gu¨nnemann. Adversarial attacks on graph neural networks via meta
learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1902.08412, 2019.
[23] Negin Entezari, Saba A Al-Sayouri, Amirali Darvishzadeh, and Evangelos E Papalexakis. All you
need is low (rank) defending against adversarial attacks on graphs. In Proceedings of the 13th
International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining, pages 169–177, 2020.
[24] Yaxin Li, Wei Jin, Han Xu, and Jiliang Tang. Deeprobust: A pytorch library for adversarial attacks
and defenses. arXiv preprint arXiv:2005.06149, 2020.
11
